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Gold has been a store of value for centuries and a safe haven for investors in the past 
decades. However, the increased investment in gold for speculative or hedging purposes 
has changed the safe haven property. We demonstrate theoretically and empirically 
that investor behaviour has the potential to destroy the safe haven property of gold. The 
results suggest that an asset cannot be both an investment asset and an effective safe 
haven asset. This finding has important implications for financial stability since assets are 
more likely to exhibit excess comovement and volatility in the absence of a safe haven. 
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1. Introduction
Gold has various roles in the global economy. It is said 
to be an inflation hedge, a “store of value”, and a safe 
haven. The safe haven means that the asset provides 
shelter in times of financial turmoil. For example, if negative 
news hit stocks in a specific country, leading to extreme 
losses and contagion to other stock markets, a safe haven 
is supposed to be immune to such an event and not lose 
its value. More recently, it appears that gold has been 
subject to increased investment demands evidenced by 
the extreme price increase from around US$300 to above 
US$1,900 within a period of 10 years. This price increase is 
comparable to the bubble in Japanese stocks in the 1980s 
and the “dotcom” bubble in Nasdaq in the 1990s. 
At first blush, it seems that gold has many appealing 
properties, but can one asset really be all things to all men? 
We illustrate that it cannot. Firstly, we show empirically that 
gold has often not displayed the properties of a store of 
value or an inflation hedge in the past 40 years. Secondly, 
using financial theory and a simple thought experiment, 
we demonstrate that the use of a safe haven asset as an 
investment or speculative asset weakens the safe haven 
property or, in extreme cases, destroys it. An empirical 
analysis fully supports the predictions of the thought 
experiment.1
There is a growing literature on gold and safe haven 
assets (e.g. see Baur and Lucey, 2010; Baur and McDermott, 
2010; and Ranaldo and Söderlind, 2010). To the best of our 
knowledge this is the first paper that analyzes the dynamic 
role of gold as a safe haven asset and the possibility that 
specific actions of investors undermine the safe haven 
property. This paper also forms part of a broader research 
question “Does the belief in gold as a safe haven asset 
reinforce or weaken its safe haven properties?”
The remainder of this paper contains three sections, 
a theoretical section, an empirical section and a policy 
section which addresses the implications for financial 
stability. The final part consists of a summary of the main 
results and concluding remarks.
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2. How investors can destroy the safe 
haven property of gold
The equity market downturn in 2000 and the low historical 
correlation of commodities with stocks prompted many 
investors to view commodities as a desirable alternative 
asset class. Since this time, commodities markets (including 
gold) have seen the investment of billions of dollars from 
institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance 
companies, and hedge funds. Consequently, commodities 
now constitute a considerable proportion of many investors’ 
portfolios (see Tang and Xiong, 2010). As a result of this, the 
price of a commodity such as gold is no longer determined 
simply by its supply and demand. The trading of investors 
who hold both stocks and gold in their portfolios can act 
as a channel to induce linkages between stock and gold 
prices. The exact nature of these links depends on investors’ 
trading strategies.
The main thesis of this paper is that the increased 
holdings of gold by many investors in recent years have 
the potential to undermine and possibly destroy the safe 
haven property of gold. To illustrate our point we describe 
the following simple thought experiment. Consider two 
scenarios labelled A and B. In scenario A investors hold 
stocks and bonds but do not hold significant amounts of 
gold in their portfolios. In scenario B investors hold stocks, 
bonds and gold. Scenario A can also be characterized as a 
period in which gold appears to be segmented from other 
asset classes and in which gold has not been discovered 
by the average investor (“the crowd”), i.e. investors have 
not realized the gains from diversification if commodities 
in general, or gold in particular, are added to a portfolio. 
Consequently, scenario B can be described as a period in 
which gold is more integrated and the potential gains from 
diversification are exploited.2
In a next step, we assume that there is a shock that 
negatively affects the prospects and thus the valuations of 
firms leading to large losses in the (global) stock market. 
We further assume that investors face borrowing or 
funding constraints (e.g. see Boyer, Kumagei and Yuan; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). However, the main 
findings also hold without this assumption.
In scenario A, investors react to the negative news by 
selling some of their holdings in stocks. The first movers 
manage to minimise their losses by moving out of stocks 
early (pushing stock prices down) and are left with excess 
capital to invest elsewhere. The “second” movers will incur 
a potentially large loss on their stock positions. Furthermore, 
they may even be forced to liquidate some of their positions 
due to margin constraints. Since investors in scenario A do 
not hold gold in their portfolios prior to the shock they cannot 
sell gold to meet margin calls or to reduce the risk of their 
portfolio after the shock. In this scenario gold is not affected 
by the shock and will act as a safe haven and not decrease 
in value. Baur and McDermott (2010) distinguish between a 
weak safe haven effect in which the price of gold does 
not decrease and a strong safe haven effect in which the 
price of gold increases. Scenario A is consistent with a weak 
safe haven effect. If we further assume that some investors 
use some of the capital freed by the sale of stocks to invest 
in gold—since it is perceived as a safe haven—scenario A 
would display a strong safe haven effect. In this scenario we 
hence observe that investors’ perceptions about gold as a 
safe haven, and their subsequent actions, have the effect 
of reinforcing the safe haven property of gold. Hence their 
beliefs are self-fulfilling.
In scenario B, however, the story can be quite different. 
Investors may show a similar initial reaction to the negative 
news as in scenario A, i.e. they sell some of their holdings 
in stocks and possibly buy gold. However, in contrast to 
scenario A, investors do hold gold in their portfolios, allowing 
for additional mechanisms through which the shock in the 
stock market can subsequently influence the market for 
gold. These mechanisms are related to investors’ portfolio 
optimization demands, liquidity constraints, and possible 
behavioural biases.
We identify four possible mechanisms through which 
an increase in the number of investors holding both gold 
and stocks in their portfolios in scenario B could undermine 
the safe haven property of gold. The ideas presented here 
are closely linked to the literature on financial contagion, 
where contagion can also be transmitted through many 
different channels. However, we mention here only those 
mechanisms that could have the potential to destroy the 
safe haven property of gold. 
Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the cross-market 
re-balancing effect (see Kodres and Pritsker, 2002) asserts 
that investors respond to shocks in the stock market 
by readjusting their portfolios and re-evaluating their 
demand for other assets, including gold.3 Assuming that an 
investor’s optimal asset allocation is to maintain a constant 
proportion of their wealth invested in each asset, they will 
attempt to readjust their portfolios to regain their optimal 
portfolio weight.4  In the process of portfolio re-balancing, 
over-weighted assets are sold and under-weighted assets 
are purchased, predicting a reduced demand for gold, 
and downward pressure on gold prices.5 We note that 
there will exist a natural time lag between the shock in the 
stock market and the resulting effect on the gold market 
since the time until investors’ portfolios moved sufficiently 
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out of line to warrant (costly) re-balancing would be strictly 
positive. However, as more investors hold gold, this time 
could be expected to shorten.
A second, related, mechanism is the wealth effect (see 
Kyle and Xiong, 2001), which states that when investors lose 
money in one asset, their capacity to bear risk is reduced, 
resulting in the liquidation of positions in all risky assets, 
hence reducing pricing in all markets.
Thirdly, the liquidity shock effect (cf. Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009) could also be at work, in which market 
participants who need to liquidate a portion of their 
assets to obtain cash, perhaps due to a call for additional 
collateral, would choose to liquidate assets in a number of 
different markets, effectively transmitting the liquidity shock 
between markets.
Finally, a more behavioural effect, the disposition effect 
(see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), suggests that investors 
are reluctant to sell assets which incur losses (they do not 
want to realize losses), instead choosing to sell assets that 
have not decreased in value. Since, in scenario B, gold 
is not under immediate selling pressure (and is expected 
to be so due to the safe haven property) investors may 
choose to liquidate gold instead. This option is not available 
to investors in scenario A. 
All the mechanisms described above would place 
downward pressure on gold prices in response to a 
negative shock in the stock market. The implication being 
that the more people holding gold in their portfolios prior 
to a shock in the stock market, the more likely mechanisms 
such as those described above would negatively influence 
the price of gold and weaken the effectiveness of the safe 
haven, i.e. shorten the period in which it does not lose its 
value.
This thought experiment provides testable implications: 
(i) gold is an effective safe haven in periods following no 
significant investment demand for gold and (ii) gold is not 
an effective safe haven in periods following significant 
investment demand for gold. We use consistent price 
changes over a certain period as indication of significant 
changes in investment demand. 
3. Empirical Evidence
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the price of gold and the 
MSCI stock index both measured at a daily frequency and 
denominated in US dollars from January 1970 to August 
2012.6
The figure illustrates that the price of gold increased 
significantly from around US$ 300 to above US$ 1,900 
between 2000 and 2011. This price increase is consistent 
with significant investment demand for gold and shows 
typical features of a bubble. 7
Figure 1: Performance of stock market and safe haven asset.
The graph shows the evolution of the MSCI World stock market index in US dollars (dashed black line) and the price of 
gold in US dollars (solid line) from 1970 to 2012.
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Figure 2: Graphical analysis of crash / financial crises.
The graph shows the crashes of October 1987 (left), September 11, 2001 (centre), and the subprime crisis and Lehman 
bankruptcy 2008 (right).
The graph also shows that gold was in a 20-year bear 
market between the late 1970s and 2000. This excludes 
gold from being a “store of value” in a strict sense since 
the price fell for a relatively long period. Because the 
price of gold did not hold its value for a significant period 
with positive inflation rates, gold was also not an effective 
inflation hedge.8 
Figure 2 illustrates the price effects of stocks and gold 
during specific crises periods and stock market crashes. The 
plots display the 1987 stock market crash, the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent fall in stock prices, 
and the subprime crisis and Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.9
The graphs show the evolution of the price of gold and 
a global stock market index around the crisis outbreak 
and demonstrate that gold acted as a safe haven in all 
periods. However, the crisis in 2008 is significantly different, 
a positive increase in the price of gold consistent with a 
strong safe haven effect is followed by a drop in the price 
of gold to a level below 100 within 4 days compared to 
around 15 trading days in the other periods.10 This price 
drop is consistent with scenario B. The price drop followed 
a sustained period of increased investment demand.11  
The fact that the price did not fall jointly with the stock 
market is also consistent with our theory outlined in scenario 
B, since most of the mechanisms described predict a 
lagged response of gold price movements to the drop 
in stock prices. For example, margin calls or portfolio re-
balancing, both requiring a sale of gold, would only arise 
after some time into the crisis.
There is another important difference in the 1987 and 
2001 crashes compared to the crisis in 2008. Gold showed 
an inverse relationship with global stocks in the first two 
episodes but a rather synchronized behaviour shortly after 
the start of the stock market downturn in 2008. This is further 
evidence that the effectiveness of the safe  haven asset 
has weakened.
It must also be mentioned that the safe haven effect 
was generally short-lived, i.e. the price of gold does not fall 
for a relatively short period of time (around 15 trading days) 
but tends to fall after that (see Baur and Lucey, 2010). If 
investors buy gold in response to a negative news shock in 
the stock market the price of gold increases (strong safe 
haven effect). If stock prices continue to fall several days 
after the initial news arrival investors may find themselves in 
a situation similar to scenario B as described above, since 
investors would now be holding a significant proportion of 
gold. In this regard, it could be argued that this effect was 
always present and that the destruction of the safe haven 
effect is nothing new. What is new is that the period of 15 
trading days is reduced significantly and in some conditions 
fully eliminated, i.e. reduced to zero trading days.
The finding of a short-lived safe haven effect is also 
directly linked to the empirical rejection of the store of value 
hypothesis. If the safe haven effect of gold was a persistent, 
long-lived, effect, gold would never exhibit a price drop 
and thus be a store of value.
Finally, an analogy based on the definition of a haven as 
a “port” and “shelter from the storm” may provide a simpler 
and perhaps more intuitive illustration of the mechanisms 
described in this paper. In such an analogy, the increased 
holding of gold in many investors’ portfolios has resulted in 
most investors now having two boats in operation; one out 
at sea and susceptible to a financial storm and a second 
in the port. During times of financial turmoil, the investors 
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(boats) who arrive at the port first are able to seek shelter 
from the storm and the continued arrival of investors 
to the port enhance their security further, due to the 
safety in numbers. However, as the storm begins to ease, 
those investors with boats still remaining at sea, and now 
damaged from the storm, must send out their second boat 
from the port to the aid of the first.
4. Financial Stability Implications
The existence or non-existence of a safe haven effect 
has strong implications for financial stability. In scenario A 
investors do not hold significant fractions of gold in their 
portfolios and thus cannot sell gold in response to their 
losses in the stock market. As a consequence gold will not 
lose its value at a time when global stock markets are in 
turmoil thereby positively influencing investor sentiment 
and indirectly stabilizing markets.
In scenario B, investors have incentives (due to portfolio 
re-balancing or wealth effects) or requirements (due 
to liquidity constraints) to sell gold following a negative 
shock in the stock market. This may lead to reduced selling 
pressure in the stock market. However, this is rather a short-
term effect. When investors realize that the value of the 
safe haven asset falls (due to the sale of gold) it is likely 
that this will lead to increased uncertainty and instability. 
For example, they may overreact to the falling price in 
the gold market by selling more stocks or gold potentially 
increasing volatility in both markets.
The scenarios described in this paper also suggest that 
there is an impossibility of an effective use of a safe haven 
asset.12  If investors do not hold the safe haven asset before 
the occurrence of a crash or a crisis (scenario A), the price 
will be stable but investors do not have the ability to reduce 
holdings in the safe haven asset to offset their losses in the 
stock market. In other words, they cannot fully exploit the 
safe haven property. If, on the other hand, investors do 
hold the safe haven asset before the occurrence of a 
crash or a crisis (scenario B), its price is more likely to fall 
following a downturn in the stock market. Hence, investors 
destroy the safe haven property precisely because they 
want to use it. Furthermore, if investors realize that the safe 
haven property is significantly influenced by their portfolio 
compositions, and thus their behaviour, this may change 
their belief in the effectiveness of the safe haven property 
and therefore fully eliminate it.
5. Conclusions
We used a simple thought experiment to demonstrate 
theoretically that significant investment in gold – due to 
its perceived safe haven and hedging properties – can 
reduce the effectiveness and thus duration of the safe 
haven effect. The empirical analysis further showed that 
the duration of the safe haven effect during the subprime 
crisis in 2008 was indeed reduced significantly. If investors 
become aware of the mechanisms working against the 
safe haven and change their beliefs about its effectiveness 
the safe haven property could be destroyed all together. 
Finally, we argued that the destruction of a safe haven 
asset has strong implications for financial stability. It is likely 
that crashes and crises are more extreme in the absence of 
a safe haven asset.
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Appendix: Optimal Portfolio Weights
Consider an investor faced with the problem of finding the 
trading strategy πt that maximizes their expected utility of 
terminal wealth
where W denotes their wealth process (started at w), and 
T their time horizon. Merton (1969, 1971) provided a simple 
and elegant solution to this problem (in continuous time) 
in a world where assets follow log-normal distributions 
(the Black-Scholes-Merton world) and for investors that 
have a power utility functions (of the CRRA class) given by 
U(x) = x1-γ/(1 − γ), where γ > 0 is the risk aversion coefficient. 
The optimal portfolio weights in this case are found to be
where Σt denotes the covariance matrix, μt denotes the 
vector of expected returns, rf the risk-free rate, and 1 the 
vector of ones. In the case of constant expectations for 
Σ and μ, this solution indicates that investors should strive 
to maintain a constant fraction of their wealth invested in 
each risky asset.
For illustrative purposes, we consider the two risky asset 
case in which we have
 
with         where St and Gt denote the 
prices of stocks and gold, respectively, and ρ the correlation 
between stocks and gold. Given this, we see from (1), that 
the portfolio fractions for stock and gold are constant in 
time and given by
 
What is neglected from the above is the existence of 
transaction costs. In the presence of such costs the optimal 
strategy is modified such that there is a no-trade region 
around the Merton proportions (given above) where a 
trade is made to rebalance the portfolio when the portfolio 
weights get too far out of line (see Davis and Norman, 1990). 
Such a strategy is consistent with the way in which many 
institutional investors operate and supports the existence of 
a lagged response between a shock in the stock market 
and (optimal) portfolio re-balancing.
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1 In this paper we focus on gold, however our theoretical arguments would work for any safe haven asset subject to 
increased investment or speculative demand.
2 Note that the safe haven property is not equal to a hedge or (mean-variance) diversification property (see Baur 
and Lucey, 2010).
3 Note that for non-US investors the role of the US dollar would have an additional effect on the portfolio re-
balancing demands since gold is denominated in US dollars. When the US dollar appreciates, gold becomes more 
expensive to international investors and their demand would decrease, causing gold prices to co-move with the 
US dollar exchange rate. We do not explore this effect further as the ideas in this paper can be expressed without 
this additional effect.
4 Appendix A provides details of the assumptions required to ensure that the optimal portfolio allocation for an 
investor is to maintain a constant proportion of his/her wealth in each asset. These assumptions may not apply to all 
investors but the idea that one should maintain a constant proportion of wealth in each asset class has permeated 
modern portfolio theory and is the aim of many institutional money managers.
5 For example, if the value of stocks and gold in US dollars is given by WS = $400 and WG = $400 with the remaining 
capital in the risk-free asset, WR = $200; corresponding to a portfolio composition of (40%, 40%, 20%). A significant 
loss in the value of stocks to WS = $300 would result in the portfolio composition moving out of line with its initial 
optimum, motivating a re-balancing of the portfolio by transferring $40 from gold and $20 from the risk-free asset to 
obtain WS = $360, WG = $360, and WR = $180. 
6 On August 15, 1971 President Nixon decreed that the US would no longer exchange dollars for gold, effectively 
ending the gold standard. Figure 1 shows the stability of the price from January 1970 until August 1971 and the 
increased fluctuation of the price of gold following the announcement in August 1971.
7 The World Gold Council provides investment demand figures. For example, in 2001 the investment demand 
(excluding jewellery and industrial demand) was 350 tonnes of gold with a value of 3.1bn US dollar. In 2008, 
investment demand was 1,200 tonnes of gold valued at 33.5bn US dollars (World Gold Council, 2011). This extreme 
trend can be explained with the financialization of commodities in general, the invention and popularity of 
exchange-traded funds, and the repercussions of the subprime crisis in 2008.
8 One may argue that gold is not meant to be a hedge against actual inflation but a hedge against (future) 
expected inflation. This argument could be used in light of the sovereign debt crisis and investors’ expectations that 
paper currency may depreciate significantly boosting the price of gold. However, this argument does not work for 
the pre-2008 period. 
9 Since a definition of the subprime crisis and the Lehman bankruptcy period is not straightforward and arbitrary to 
some degree we tried alternative start dates to analyse the robustness of the results, observing similar findings for 
all dates. The use of the MSCI World index complicates the optimal choice of the crisis date since some country-
specific effects are less evident in a global context. Crisis time-lines, as published by central banks for example, can 
identify key dates of crisis origination and thus help to define and justify the crisis window. A focus on the US stock 
market would lead to stronger results. 
10 See Baur and Lucey (2010) on the duration of the safe haven effect.
11 We tested whether gold displayed bubble-like features using a bubble test proposed by Phillips and Yu (2011). The 
results show that gold indeed followed a price path consistent with a bubble. 
12 This idea is related to the impossibility of informationally efficient markets proposed by Grossman & Stiglitz (1980).
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